On March 18, 2026, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington denied Macy’s motion to dismiss a putative class action alleging violations of Washington’s Commercial Electronic Mail Act (“CEMA”). The court rejected arguments that CEMA is preempted by the federal CAN-SPAM Act and that it violates the Dormant Commerce Clause. The ruling continues a growing line of decisions in Washington federal courts allowing CEMA claims to proceed against national retailers.
Background
A group of plaintiffs brought claims on behalf of themselves and a putative class alleging that Macy’s sent commercial emails containing false or misleading subject lines to Washington residents in violation of CEMA, RCW 19.190 et seq. Macy’s moved to dismiss the complaint and separately moved to stay discovery pending resolution of its motion.
The Court’s Ruling
Federal Preemption Under CAN-SPAM. Macy’s argued that the federal CAN-SPAM Act preempts plaintiffs’ CEMA claims. The court rejected this argument, noting that it had already done so in Jerde v. BYLT LLC and relying on a series of consistent decisions from the Western and Eastern Districts of Washington, including Kempf v. Fullbeauty Brands Operations, LLC, Ma v. Nike, Inc., Harrington v. Vineyard Vines, LLC, and State of Washington v. Ulta Salon Cosmetics & Fragrance, Inc.
The court agreed with the reasoning in Ulta Salon, which held that CAN-SPAM expressly allows states to prohibit “falsity or deception” in commercial email messages by statute, regulation, or rule. Because CEMA’s subject-line provision, RCW 19.190.020(1)(b), imposes liability only for emails that contain “false or misleading information in the subject line,” the provision falls squarely within CAN-SPAM’s savings clause and is not preempted. The court further noted that CEMA does not “sound in fraud” and that Congress’s use of the words “falsity or deception” in the CAN-SPAM exception indicates an intent to reach more broadly than fraud claims alone, meaning Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard does not apply.
Dormant Commerce Clause. Macy’s also argued that CEMA is unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause, contending that the statute impermissibly regulates conduct outside Washington and excessively burdens interstate commerce. The court rejected this challenge as well, agreeing with the analyses in Kempf and Ulta Salon that CEMA neither discriminates in favor of in-state interests nor controls commerce occurring wholly outside the state. Because Macy’s failed to show that CEMA substantially burdens interstate commerce, the court did not need to engage in balancing under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
Washington Consumer Protection Act Claim. Finally, Macy’s argued that the plaintiffs’ Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”) claim should be dismissed because it depends on the CEMA claim. Because the court found the CEMA claim survives on both preemption and constitutional grounds, the CPA claim likewise remains.
The court denied the motion to dismiss in its entirety and denied as moot Macy’s motion to stay discovery.
STEPHANIE AGNEW, FELISA BRYANT, DEBORAH CERKEZOGLU, AZA ZHAMBEKOVA, & SHAWNA STUMP, on their own behalf & on behalf of others similarly situated, v. MACY’S RETAIL HOLDINGS, LLC, No. 2:25-CV-02006-JHC, 2026 WL 764140 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 18, 2026).
