Judge Beth Labson Freeman, in the Northern District of California, dismissed a TCPA class action, but granted leave to amend, highlighting both the broad reach of the TCPA and the high bar for pleading direct or vicarious liability.
TCPA Applies to Text Messages
Defendant argued that the TCPA’s section 227(c), which restricts calls to numbers on the National Do Not Call Registry, does not apply to text messages because the statute does not explicitly reference “text” or “SMS” messages. The court rejected this argument, noting that the statute’s language and purpose focus on the nature of the communication—unsolicited solicitations—rather than the specific technology used. The court cited both statutory language and precedent, confirming that a “telephone call” under the TCPA encompasses text messages.
As a preliminary matter, it is unsurprising that the statute does not use the term “text message” because, as Plaintiff points out, the statute was enacted in 1991, before the first-ever text message was sent in 1992. See Keating v. Peterson’s Nelnet, LLC, 615 F. App’x 365, 370 (6th Cir. 2015). In determining whether
section 227(c) applies to text messages, the Court looks to the plain meaning of the text rather than the specific facts or technology that Congress may have had in mind in 1991 at the time of the TCPA’s passage. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
Construing the provisions of a statute requires the Court to begin with its language—the inquiry begins and ends with the text if it is clear and unambiguous.
McDonald v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2008). The TCPA itself does not define the term “call,” which is a “request, demand, or command, [especially] to come or assemble.” Call, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). This definition makes clear that a “call” is distinguished from other communications such as a “lesson” or “message” by the meaning it conveys, not the form it takes. The Ninth Circuit has already held that the term refers to both oral and written communications. See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 953–54 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” of the “call” is “to communicate or try to get into communication with a person by a telephone” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
The court further explained that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and multiple courts have consistently interpreted “call” to include text messages, and that the remedial purpose of the TCPA supports a broad reading to protect consumer privacy.
Pleading Requirements for TCPA Claims
Despite finding that the TCPA covers text messages, the court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff’s allegations that defendant sent unsolicited text messages were deemed conclusory, lacking factual support to plausibly establish that the defendant was directly or vicariously responsible for the messages. To establish direct liability, a plaintiff must plead facts showing the defendant itself sent the messages. For vicarious liability, the complaint must allege an agency relationship or identify third parties acting on the defendant’s behalf.
The court found the complaint deficient because it did not provide details about how the plaintiff determined the defendant sent the messages, nor did it identify any agents or third parties involved.
CHET MICHAEL WILSON, v. MEDVIDI INC, No. 5:25-CV-03996-BLF, 2025 WL 2856295 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025).
