In Kashanian v. Nat’l Enter. Sys., Inc., No. A171046, 2025 WL 2586695, at *2–3 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2025), the Court of Appeal in an unpublished decision reversed a trial court’s dismissal of a Rosenthal Act class action because the Plaintiff suffered no actual damage
Under the Collection Notice law, third party debt collectors must provide debtors a notice informing them of certain rights. (§ 1812.700, subd. (a).) Violations of that law also constitute violations of the RosenthalAct. (§ 1812.702.) In turn, that act requires debt collectors to comply with certain provisions of the FDCPA. (§ 1788.17 [“every debt collector collecting or attempting to collect a consumer debt shall comply with the provisions of [15 U.S.C.] Sections 1692b to 1692j”]; 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.) The RosenthalAct also imposes liability for violations. (See, e.g., § 1788.30, subds. (a)–(b).)2 Relevant here, debt collectors are subject “to the remedies in Section 1692k.” (§ 1788.17; Timlick v. National Enterprise Systems, Inc. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 674, 681; Alkan v. Citimortgage, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2004) 336 F.Supp.2d 1061, 1065 [the Legislature “simply incorporated by reference the text of certain federal provisions into the [RosenthalAct], rather than copying them verbatim into the California code”].) Section 1692k renders a debt collector liable to individual persons “in an amount equal to the sum of—[¶] (1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of such failure; [¶] (2) (A) in the case of any action by an individual, such additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $ 1,000.” (§ 1692k(a)(1)–(2)(A).) For class actions, a debt collector is liable for “(i) such amount for each named plaintiff as could be recovered under subparagraph (A), and (ii) such amount as the court may allow for all other class members, without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the lesser of $ 500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt collector.” (§ 1692k(a)(2)(B).) The RosenthalAct “authorizes consumers who receive noncompliant collection letters to sue for the violation of their statutory rights, and nothing in the statute suggests that any injury beyond the noncompliance is required to impose civil liability per named plaintiff.” (Chai v. Velocity Investments, LLC (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1040 (Chai) [construing similar provisions of California’s Fair Debt Buying Practices Act (§ 1788.50 et seq.)].) The Legislature has deemed a violation to be “an injury sufficient to confer standing—independent of actual damages—and provide[d] a modest monetary award as a remedy … for those motivated to pursue it.” (Ibid.; Kim, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 84 [standing based on violation of statute].) Section 1692k distinguishes between “any actual damage” resulting from a RosenthalAct violation and statutory damages — additional damages that the court may allow. (§ 1692k(a)(2)(A)–(B); Guracar v. Student Loan Solutions, LLC (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 330, 348 (Guracar) [“the FDCPA provides for recovery of actual damages in addition to statutory damages”].) Individuals are “entitled to actual damages if ‘[a]ny’—and without limitation.” (Chai, at p. 1038; Estate of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 915–916 [same construction applies to identical or substantially similar statutory language regarding the same or analogous subject].) That is, a debt collector is only liable for actual damages if any exist. But by declaring a debt collector liable for “the sum of” actual and statutory damages, section 1692k “signifies that actual damages only add” to their liability, and “not that the absence of actual damages negates” liability. (Chai, at p. 1038, italics added.) The provision thus authorizes a court to award statutory damages to a debtor, even in the absence of actual damage. (Ibid.) The factors that section 1692k requires courts to consider when awarding statutory damages in a class action — “the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, the resources of the debt collector, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the debt collector’s noncompliance was intentional” — undergird our conclusion. (§ 1692k(b)(2).) Rather than assessing the extent of the debtor’s actual harm, these factors evaluate the debt collector’s culpability. (Baker v. G.C. Services Corp. (9th Cir. 1982) 677 F.2d 775, 780–781.) And the range of available awards based on these factors — “such amount as the court may allow,” but capped at the lesser of $500,000 or 1 percent of the debt collector’s net worth — indicates that statutory damages are not intended to reflect actual harm. (Ibid.) Had “the Legislature intended to limit standing to plaintiffs who had sustained actual damages, it could have done so.” (Chai, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040.) For example, some consumer protection statutes only permit claims by those who sustain injuries from violations. (Compare §§ 1788 et seq., 1812.702 with §§ 1780, subd. (a) [authorizing any “consumer who suffers any damage” to bring an action under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act], 1789.35, subd. (g) [“[a]ny person who is injured by any violation” of provisions governing check cashiers “may bring an action for the recovery of damages”].) We presume the Legislature intentionally omitted such language from the RosenthalAct, and we will not read it back in. (People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669, 691.) Because a debt collector’s violation of the RosenthalAct makes them liable for statutory damages — regardless of whether there were actual damages — we conclude a statutory violation is sufficient to confer standing upon a consumer. (Guracar, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 348–349.)
