The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois addressed the intersection of biometric privacy and the trucking industry. Plaintiff alleged that a trucking company collected and stored facial scans of its drivers via in-cab cameras without obtaining the required written consent, in violation of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). The plaintiff, a former truck driver, claims that the company failed to disclose its biometric data practices and did not secure employee authorization as mandated by BIPA.
The court examined whether the facial scans at issue qualify as “biometric identifiers” under BIPA. The statute defines biometric identifiers to include scans of face geometry that can be used to identify an individual. The plaintiff alleged that the company’s cameras scanned drivers’ faces and linked the data to specific employees, which the court found sufficient at this stage to plausibly plead a BIPA violation. The court clarified that BIPA does not require actual use of the data for identification—only that the data is capable of identifying an individual.
Federal Preemption: Does the FAAAA Override BIPA?
A central defense raised by the trucking company was that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) preempts BIPA, arguing that compliance with BIPA would significantly impact its prices, routes, or services. The company argued that requiring written consent for biometric data collection would increase costs and operational complexity, potentially affecting customer service and public safety.
The court distinguished between state laws that directly regulate a carrier’s services to customers (which may be preempted) and those that govern the employer-employee relationship (which are less likely to be preempted). The court found that BIPA’s requirements—such as obtaining written consent and maintaining data retention policies—primarily affect the company’s relationship with its workforce, not its services to customers. The court also noted that increased labor or administrative costs alone are generally too indirect to trigger preemption under the FAAAA.
