Ruling on a motion to dismiss, Judge Eumi K. Lee in the Northern District of California held that the CA DMV (who could not be joined) was not an indispensable party to claims that Google technology running on the DMV’s website violated privacy rights. In large part, the Court’s holding was based on the proposition that just because Plaintiff could not receive complete relief doesn’t mean she was prohibited from any relief.
Google contends that the complaint should be dismissed because the DMV is a required party that cannot be joined. Mot. at 4-11. It is undisputed that the DMV cannot be joined; thus, the critical issue is whether the DMV is a required party.2 On that issue, Google argues that: (1) the Court cannot grant complete relief without the DMV; (2) proceeding without the DMV would impair the DMV’s interests; and (3) the DMV’s absence may subject Google to undue liability. See Mot. at 5-10. The Court addresses these arguments in turn.
First, Google argues that Plaintiff’s “relief will be hollow without the DMV” because, even if Plaintiff prevails against Google, the “DMV would remain free to simply repeat its conduct with another advertising services company, continuing to cause Plaintiff the same alleged injury.” Mot. at 5-6. This argument was recently rejected in a similar case alleging that LinkedIn surreptitiously obtains disability information from the DMV. See Jackson v. LinkedIn Corp., 744 F. Supp. 3d 986, 990 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (“Jackson I”) (“[T]hat the DMV might continue to gather [plaintiff’s] personal information from another third-party analytics provider does not require the DMV’s joinder in this lawsuit focusing on LinkedIn’s own tracking technology.”). The Court reaches the same conclusion here. The theory underlying Google’s argument is that, if a third party might engage in the same conduct alleged here against Google, then Plaintiff cannot obtain “complete relief,” so the Court should deprive Plaintiff of any relief by dismissing this action. Such a result would be illogical and inconsistent with the Rule 19 joinder inquiry, which “is a practical, fact-specific one, designed to avoid the harsh results of rigid application.” Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist., 276 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002). To the extent another advertising company allegedly violates Plaintiff’s privacy rights, the proper course is to pursue an action against the other party too – not to deny Plaintiff recourse against Google.
*3 Second, Google argues that proceeding without the DMV would impair the DMV’s interests because: (1) “the Court may have to hold that the DMV’s conduct violated the law,” and (2) this action “directly implicates the DMV’s contractual agreements with Google and may result in a finding that the DMV violated those agreements.” Mot. at 8. But “an adverse ruling [against Google] would not necessarily require a finding that the DMV” violated the law because Plaintiff claims only that Google unlawfully obtained and used her sensitive information. Jackson I, 744 F. Supp. 3d at 991 (“Whether the DMV’s collection and transmission of [plaintiff’s] personal information was unlawful or a breach … is not before this Court.”). Google’s argument that the DMV might have breached Google’s terms of service, which required the DMV not to share sensitive information with Google, see Mot. at 8-9, raises a factual question that the Court cannot resolve at the pleading stage. Doing so would require the Court to ignore well-pleaded allegations that Google “intentionally encourages” the DMV to use Google’s tracking tools to provide Google with sensitive information, and that Google “specifically designed” its tracking tools for this purpose. Compl. ¶¶ 37, 70; see also infra Section III.B.2.
Third, Google argues that the DMV’s absence may subject Google to undue liability because, if the Court enjoins Google from obtaining personal information from the DMV, “Google has no realistic means of complying.” Mot. at 10. But dismissing Plaintiff’s claims outright based on difficulties in crafting injunctive relief would be draconian, particularly because Plaintiff seeks other relief too – including damages. This concern can be addressed at a later stage by tailoring injunctive relief if Plaintiff demonstrates she is entitled to it.
The Court went on to address Plaintiff’s allegations that Google both intercepted her confidential communications and misused those communications in violation of CIPA section 631(a):
First, Google argues that it cannot be liable under CIPA because Google is the DMV’s vendor, and thus acted as a party to the communications between Plaintiff and the DMV, not as a third-party eavesdropper. Mot. at 19-21. Google relies on Graham v. Noom, which held that a vendor does not violate CIPA where it merely “provides a software service that captures its clients’ data … and allows the clients to analyze their data” but has not “intercepted and used the data itself.” 533 F. Supp. 3d 823, 832 (N.D. Cal. 2021). This argument fails because Plaintiff alleges that Google intercepted and used her personal information for its own advertising services. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 38, 42, 44-45, 48-70. Based on these allegations, Google did not act solely as an extension of the DMV. Jackson I, 744 F. Supp. 3d at 994.
Second, Google argues that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that Google intercepted her communications with the DMV while they were “in transit.” Mot. at 22-24. But Plaintiff alleges that Google intercepted her communications with the DMV as she entered information over the internet through the DMV website and submitted her renewal application. See Compl. ¶¶ 39-40, 65-69. Google notes that there is tension between the DPPA and CIPA claims in that the information Google allegedly obtained cannot be both “from a motor vehicle record” and from Plaintiff’s communication with the DMV. Mot. at 23. As discussed above, the Court agrees that the current allegations fail to state a DPPA claim – but they suffice for the CIPA claim.
*6 Third, Google argues that Plaintiff fails to allege that it acted willfully. Mot. at 24-25. However, Plaintiff alleges in detail that Google intercepted her personal information to offer targeted advertising services, which is essential to Google’s business. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 29, 38, 41-42, 44-45, 47. These allegations of Google’s purpose permit an inference of willfulness. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Google “specifically designed” its tracking tools to gather information, id. ¶¶ 70, 117, and “intentionally encourages” website operators to use its tools in a way that circumvents users’ privacy settings, id. ¶¶ 37, 103.
Google argues that its terms of service required the DMV not to share “personally identifiable information” with Google, thus proving that Google did not intend to obtain Plaintiff’s personal information. Mot. at 3, 24. But the Court cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts in Google’s terms of service for the purpose of creating a defense against the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint. Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Smith v. Google LLC, 735 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (“While Google argues that judicially noticeable policy documents suggest that Google did not actually want to receive personally identifiable information and expressly prohibited developers from transmitting such data, this presents a question of fact that the Court cannot resolve at this stage.”). Google cites Doe v. Google LLC to support its reliance on the terms of service. 741 F. Supp. 3d 828, 844 (N.D. Cal. 2024). But in Doe, “the complaint acknowledge[d] that Google repeatedly told developers not to send personally identifiable information through use of its source code.” Id. at 840. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Google “intentionally encourages” the DMV to harvest and share personal information. Compl. ¶¶ 37, 103.
Before denying Google’s motion to dismiss the CIPA claim, the Court rejected its argument that its terms of service prohibited the DMV from sharing PII.
KATHERINE WILSON, Plaintiff, v. GOOGLE LLC, Defendant., No. 24-CV-03176-EKL, 2025 WL 901941, at *2–7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2025).
